What Went Right: Two Best Cases of Islam in Europe - Cordoba, Spain and Sarajevo, Bosnia by Shenk, Gerald
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 26 | Issue 4 Article 1
11-2006
What Went Right: Two Best Cases of Islam in
Europe - Cordoba, Spain and Sarajevo, Bosnia
Gerald Shenk
Eastern Mennonite Seminary, Harrisonburg, Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Other Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
Shenk, Gerald (2006) "What Went Right: Two Best Cases of Islam in Europe - Cordoba, Spain and Sarajevo, Bosnia," Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 26: Iss. 4, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol26/iss4/1
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVI, 4 (November 2006) page 1.
WHAT WENT RIGHT: TWO BEST CASES OF ISLAM IN EUROPE
- CORDOBA, SPAIN AND SARAJEVO, BOSNIA
By Gerald Shenk
Gerald Shenk (Mennonite) is Professor of Church and Society at Eastern Mennonite
Seminary, Harrisonburg, Virginia (USA). He received his Ph.D. at Northwestern
University and Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary; M.A. from Fuller
Theological Seminary, and B.S. from Eastern Mennonite University. He began
writing this paper during his sabbatical at the Tantur Ecumenical Institute in
Jerusalem in 2003 and completed it at his home institution.
Two historic chapters of long-term Islamic presence in Europe should be noted again
in the current climate of mutual suspicion and heightened tensions between Christians and
Muslims. Medieval Spain and the Ottoman period in Bosnia both merit renewed scrutiny,
because each chapter contains some valuable lessons for the historic interaction of complex
religious systems. Subsequent history tends to obscure the collective cultural memory of
these richly generative chapters because of their later, more tension-ridden dissolution.
Recent research reviewing each of these periods of Islamic presence and influence in
Europe is reminding us that within the sustained interaction of complex religious heritages
the differences can provide not only friction or stress, but creativity and refinement as well, if
properly sustained and structured. A backward glance at these two long chapters in European
history with Islam may shed some positive light on the potential for constructive engagement
today, despite our numerous current flare-ups and banner-headline culture clashes.
If we were taking cues only from geopolitical strategists and scholars of conflict such
as Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations, 1996), Samuel Barber (Jihad vs. McWorld,
1996), Meic Pearse, (Why the Rest Hates the West, 2005), and Bernard Lewis (What Went
Wrong? 2003), the literature is rife with explanations of how badly things have gone in this
field. Religion-and-conflict has become a standard interpretive paradigm.
It is rarer to find accounts of “what went right,” in the encounters between major
religious systems throughout history. This may be a rich vein in which to mine for hints of
the quieter chapters unrecorded or sidelined in standard accounts that ordinarily rehearse all
the dreary chapters of warfare among the nation states. There may be something about life
along the edges of great tectonic plates that not only produces friction but also generates
creativity, surprise and intrigue. Inhabitants of such border regions are often renowned for
their fortitude, and for hardy and rugged survival skills. Their profiles contrast with the
 See Tolkien’s “Southrons” in The Lord of the Rings, and C. S. Lewis’s “Calormen” in The Horse and His1
Boy.
 Istanbul’s residents include many with powerful memories of high points achieved in Bosnia’s Islamic2
culture; Palestinian cafes in East Jerusalem’s Old City marketplace with names like “al-Andalus” celebrate the glories
of Islam in Spain (Cordoba).
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relative calm of heartland territories, the settled life that takes its own values mostly for
granted. 
Along the shifting boundaries of the Islamic encounter with Europe, long before the
current patterns of economic migration and immigrant communities (e.g. Germany’s
Gastarbeiter or post-colonial Algerians in France), two large-scale engagements have
become intrinsic to the collective cultural memories. Although the overall impressions are not
exactly parallel, both are remembered (from the point of Europe itself) as largely negative,
dark chapters with lingering traces and effects. Of the two, Spain to the southwest remains the
brighter, while the Ottoman reign in southeastern Europe constitutes a mostly shadowed
realm. Shakespeare and other mythmakers frequently invoke the Moor from the southwest as
a symbol of intrigue and the glories of a lost civilization, but children’s literature abounds
with threats of swarthy hordes of Turk-like invaders from the southeast, replete with curved
scimitars and elephants.   A different set of memories, however, may be discerned with more1
careful listening to somewhat obscured historical accounts.2
My own interest in examining the “tectonic” activity between religions grew out of
interactions with Eastern Europe that span almost three decades, beginning with studies and
residence in Tito’s Yugoslavia from 1977. Two of those years I was resident in Bosnia (1979-
81). Those two years began an enduring fascination for me with complex interactions of
religious groups amid the pressures of contemporary society (in those days of communist
rule). Memories from different chapters of religion in society varied widely there, depending
largely on whether a given group had enjoyed privileges of alignment with current ruling
powers or languished under the yoke of minority restraints.
Further explorations have recently reminded me of some fascinating links between
Bosnia’s Islamic chapter and its parallels in medieval Spain. At the height of its glory, with
its period of Muslim rule and its interactions of complex religious systems, medieval Spain
resembled the best of what Bosnia has sometimes been. We’ll take a look back briefly at that
bright Islamic chapter in Spain, and then trace some links to Bosnia’s realities. Some
glimpses of al-Andalus provide hints or intimations that this complex interaction of different
 Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture3
of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2002).
 Menocal, p. 57.4
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religious systems can indeed “work”— not only for the advantage of one party in power, but
rather to the mutual good of each participating group.
Cordoba’s Beacon of Tolerance in Medieval Spain
The account by Yale scholar Maria Rosa Menocal of medieval Spain tells of a 250-
year experiment in creating what constitutes a much brighter picture of, as she portrays it, a
“culture of tolerance” among Christians, Jews and Muslims.   It begins in 750 C.E. with the3
flight of Abd al-Rahman, a refugee from the overthrow of his family’s dynasty in Damascus,
as the lone survivor when all the other ruling Umayyads were massacred by the insurgent
Abbasids in the heartlands of Islam.
Abd al-Rahman fled to the farthest reaches of his family’s realm, across the
Mediterranean Islamic world in search of safe harbor and a fresh start. He crossed the regions
of North Africa to take up his struggle in what had been a sleepy province in Spain at the far
western fringes of the Islamic world, where he arrived by 755 C.E.
Not content merely to survive, the last of the Umayyads promptly turned his
European province into a thriving cultural center in its own right, and proclaimed it an
emirate with himself as emir (governor) in 756 C.E. Within 100 years, his successors were
proclaiming it the true caliphate (855 C.E.), the spiritual succession in a contested line of
authority descending directly from the Prophet Muhammad.
Abd al-Rahman’s new realm was characterized by an “open-hearted and eclectic
syncretism” in keeping with the Umayyads and their skill in appropriating the best of what
they found in newly conquered lands and cultures. With strong and skillful administration,
Abd al-Rahman played down the ethnic rivalries between Syrian and Berber forces in his
realm, even when some of them turned for help to the nearby Charlemagne in his ascendancy,
forging alliances against their own Islamic rule.  He himself was the offspring of a mixed4
ethnic heritage (mother Berber and father Syrian). He was therefore kin both to the Berber
settlers who flooded across from North Africa earlier in the century (711 C.E.) and to the
Umayyad soldiers who led them, agents of his own dynasty (the Umayyad empire).
What makes the case instructive for our inquiry today are not the particular features
and dramas of any one of Spain’s constituent religious communities, but what happened in
 Menocal points to Moorish architecture in 19 -century synagogues built in New York City (p. 12).5 th
 Menocal, p. 11.6
 Menocal, pp. 11-12.7
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the mixture of all three: Roman Catholic, Jewish and Muslim. What qualities of their
interaction made it so fruitful that the impact of those cultural encounters may still be traced
in far-flung corners of the world today? 5
Menocal cites an observation from F. Scott Fitzgerald to explain some of the genius
of the situation; Fitzgerald claims that “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold
two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time” (in his essay, “The Crack-Up”). She
continues,
In its moments of great achievement, medieval culture positively thrived on
holding at least two, and often many more, contrary ideas at the same time.
This was the chapter of Europe’s culture when Jews, Christians, and Muslims
lived side by side and, despite their intractable differences and enduring
hostilities, nourished a complex culture of tolerance ( . . . ). This only
sometimes included guarantees of religious freedoms comparable to those we
would expect in a modern “tolerant” state; rather, it found expression in the
often unconscious acceptance that contradictions—within oneself, as well as
within one’s culture—could be positive and productive. Much that was
characteristic of medieval culture was profoundly rooted in the cultivation of
the complexities, charms, and challenges of contradictions—of the “yes and
no,” as it was put by Peter Abelard, the infamous twelfth-century Parisian
intellectual and Christian theologian.6
Menocal describes this experiment as continuing well beyond the 250 years of actual
Islamic rule, since the quality of intense interaction among the religious communities
persisted even after Christian powers had re-conquered the territories in Spain. Using the
Arabic designation for the region, she notes that
the very heart of culture as a series of contraries lay in al-Andalus . . .  It was
there that the profoundly Arabized Jews rediscovered and reinvented
Hebrew; there that Christians embraced nearly every aspect of Arabic
style—from the intellectual style of philosophy to the architectural styles of
mosques—not only while living in Islamic dominions but especially after
wresting political control from them; there that men of unshakable faith, like
Abelard and Maimonides and Averroes, saw no contradiction in pursuing the
truth, whether philosophical or scientific or religious, across confessional
lines. This vision of a culture of tolerance recognized that incongruity in the
shaping of individuals as well as their cultures was enriching and productive.
It was an approach to life and its artistic and intellectual and even religious
pursuits that was contested by many—as it is today—and violently as at
times—as it is today—and yet powerful and shaping nevertheless, for
hundreds of years.7
 Menocal, p. 33.8
 Menocal, p. 41.9
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If Menocal’s portrayal is largely persuasive in the overall patterns, we may
understand this complex interaction as sharpening and stimulating each of the religious
communities to develop its own resources within the encounters portrayed. The flowering of
civilization in al-Andalus, as she describes it, included the introduction of new crops and
techniques in agriculture, new patterns of trade and commerce, and new standards for cultural
activity such as poetry, and a flourishing of arts and learning unrivalled anywhere else in
Europe during the same period. By the beginning of the tenth century, Cordoba, its capital,
becomes an exemplary showcase of architecture and wealth. The caliph’s library, by one
count, is said to have held some four hundred thousand volumes, “and this at a time when the
largest library in Christian Europe probably held no more than four hundred manuscripts.”8
Menocal reports a total of seventy libraries in Cordoba. Its love of learning was palpable and
contagious.
Factional rivalries within the Islamic community eventually tore al-Andalus apart,
resulting in the end of the proclaimed Caliphate in 1031 C.E. The ensuing turmoil of small
and regional kingdoms on the Spanish peninsula did not bring the creative cultural interaction
to a halt, however. Menocal shows that the ongoing “commingling of languages, religions
and styles of every sort—food, clothes, songs, buildings—took place not only within the
Iberian Peninsula, although certainly most vigorously there, but with increasing intensity far
beyond the Pyrenees.”  9
While Menocal traces out the far-reaching implications of the cultural achievements
deriving from the creative complex interactions of Judaism, Islam and Christianity in the
periods following the demise of Islamic rule in Spain, the account for our purposes in this
inquiry may be content with finding that the intensity of interactions had produced
remarkably fruitful results in each of the constituent religious communities. The wars of
conquest and of rival factions and of neighboring empires on the rise did not diminish the
positive accomplishments of intense religious encounters. Indeed, rising tensions in the
political world only heightened the growing interest on the part of less-civilized neighbors to
the north in Europe to acquire and borrow as much as possible from the science and
knowledge with which al Andalus had been blessed and burdened.
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Remarkable for this inquiry is the recognition that the story begun so long ago in the
magical combination of civilizing forces in Islamic Spain has a true and historic footnote in
late medieval Bosnia, in Sarajevo. Menocal’s account ends where the second part of this
inquiry picks up, with the complex issues of ethnic identity and tensions and intriguing
cultural influences coming together in the Balkans. The collection of Passover meditations
known as the Sarajevo Haggadah, a gorgeous medieval manuscript, was brought to Sarajevo
during the Ottoman period by Spanish-speaking refugees, Jews forced out of Spain by the
Catholic reconquista and the Edict of Expulsion in 1492.
Bosnia’s Colorful Legacy
One wonders what parallels to Muslim Spain might be found in the rise of an Islamic
presence in the heart of the European Balkans. Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo adds the intrigue of
its location along the historic fault line between the two major branches of the Christian
heritage in the region, Orthodox and Catholic. In any number of centuries since the arrival of
Slavic peoples in migrations dating from the sixth and seventh centuries (C.E.), recruitment
efforts based both in Rome and in Constantinople (Istanbul today) were zealous to secure the
allegiance of the newly arriving tribes for their respective church orbits.
The ancient Hebrew cemetery on one of Sarajevo’s slopes is mute but eloquent
testimony to the refuge that Jews in many centuries from across Europe found in Sarajevo
during Muslim Ottoman rule. Inscriptions on gravestones evidence most of the languages of
the European Jewish diaspora, including Polish, Czech and Hungarian. Most intriguing,
perhaps, are the inscriptions in Ladino, the variation on Spanish which corresponds to
Yiddish in relation to German. Ladino and Spanish inscriptions recall the immigration from
Inquisition Spain, and the Ladino language has been maintained to this day in spite of terrors
and persecutions, surviving even the Holocaust and decimation of the Jewish population in
the 1940s.
The Serbian population in Bosnia is largely rural, and their numbers in the capital
city of Sarajevo during the Tito years (roughly 1943 through his death in 1980) were
relatively small. Of the major religious establishments in the city, the Orthodox churches
were often not able to draw large numbers of participants, except for the primary calendar
events such as Christmas and Easter. A sturdy number of stalwarts were on hand at the oldest
 The Jewish population of the city of Sarajevo stood at 10-12% during the early 20  century.10 th
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of the Orthodox churches during that era, however, to greet occasional visitors and tourists
browsing from the nearby BaÓarÓija, the large Turkish-style bazaar.
Orthodox Christians would tell the tale of how the space for their church came to be
made available, during a long-ago visit to the city by an Ottoman official. When the Sultan
passed by, they said, the petitioners asked for a place to construct their house of worship. He
allowed them the space of a single ox-hide. Amid the large-scale construction of monuments
and mosques in the 16  century, this surely seemed a meager grant. But the next morning, asth
he once again passed by their chosen site, the sturdy Orthodox are reported to have shown
him a much larger space, now inscribed at its circumference by the thin band of leather cut
from a single ox-hide. And for the cleverness of their solution, it is recalled with no small
glee that the Sultan granted them the full amount of their request.
This tale, remembered with approval by Serbs and Muslims alike, recounts a quality
of interaction that is characteristic of pre-war Sarajevo. There is an intrigue that makes
Bosnia itself something different than (and more than) any of its constituent populations
whose nearby homelands (Serbia, Croatia, Turkey) are far more homogeneous in culture and
religion.
When I lived in Sarajevo near the very close of the Tito era, I resided among its
Muslim inhabitants not far from the central marketplace. I discovered an Islamic community
on the verge of a modest cultural recovery, complete with a newly opened theological faculty
(1977). Just a few years later the city hosted the Winter Olympics (1984), basking in the
global spotlight with pristine beauty on display in the rugged peaks and spectacular vistas of
its unspoiled terrain. 
Invariably when Sarajlije (residents of Sarajevo) in the late 1970s learned of my
interest in sociology and religion, they would insist that the time for religion to dominate
society had completely passed away. Under Tito, they insisted, all the religions are free but
not allowed to control society. “It is a private matter for the individual,” they would urge. 
The period of communist rule in Tito’s Yugoslavia was, in fact, quite strenuously
secular; the particulars of an individual’s religious beliefs or participation were treated as so
private that the state declined to include any such polling in census data. While it was of
crucial importance to know the ethnic composition of a mixed population such as Bosnia’s
(Muslim some 40%, Serbian over 30%, Croat over 20%),   there was no simple correlation10
 Prof. Dr. Aleksa Buha, the dean of the humanities faculty whose signature graces my Indeks (official11
course register and transcript), became the official spokesman for Radovan Karadñi, currently indicted and wanted
for trial as a war criminal at the Hague Tribunal.
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between ethnic identity and actual individual participation in the corresponding religious
heritage. While Croats are traditionally Catholic, and Serbs traditionally Orthodox, many had
given up the vigorous practices of devout adherents. Hence, the estimates of actual religious
adherence varied widely (and seasonally, one might observe).
For the Muslim population, the peculiar convention had emerged whereby Musliman
(“Muslim”) designated an ethnic nationality within the Yugoslav federation, while musliman
(“muslim”) was used to refer to the religious participants in the Islamic faith community. A
person might explain that “I am a Muslim by ethnic heritage, but not in a religious sense.”
I found the Bosnians as a whole (and especially the Muslims, who like the
Macedonians had quite recently gained the status of a distinct nationality within Tito’s fine-
tuned system of federation and regional balancing of powers), were often more ardent about
the virtues of a secular socialist society than were their fellow Croats or Serbs elsewhere in
Yugoslavia. They took their role at the literal geographic center of the society quite seriously,
even in the latter days of the 1980s when Tito was gone and the separate nationalisms were
emerging to pull the different republics apart at the seams. Bosnians would say that “even if
the Serbs and Croats rip their territories apart in civil war, we’ll never let it happen here. In
Bosnia it would be just too terrible! We Bosnians know how to live together peaceably.”
But just a dozen years later, the house where I lived, the classrooms where I studied,
the cafes where we debated and the national library where we tried to find required texts—all
were targeted, burned or blown to bits in a frenzy of wanton destruction and ethnic hatred
that seemed to come out of nowhere. What is this sudden vicious revitalization of everything
that tears people to shreds? Whatever happened to the ideals of the religions that shared the
space (however uneasily) for centuries leading up to this madness?
And how could my own Marxist humanities professors at the Philosophy Faculty turn
up at the forefront of the most strident and poisoned political factions on all sides?  Our11
hauntingly beautiful, beloved Bosnia became a symbol of intractable ethnic hatred and hyper-
intolerance, of all that is worst in the human community. How ironic, when for many
previous decades it had seemed to embody in part the same rich mix that Menocal describes
in medieval Spain.
 (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2003). Cf. also a review of Velikonja by N. G.12
Shenk, in Religion in Eastern Europe, XXIII, 6 (December 2003), pp. 59-63.
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Beyond the personal anguish for anyone who knew Bosnia and its inhabitants, the
fierce new complex of questions leading to a reappraisal of social and cultural dynamics at
work in the conflicts there were never “merely academic,” whether for journalists or generals
or humanitarian aid workers who began streaming toward Bosnia’s open strife in the mid-
1990s.
So what was the role of religion in all of this? The communist period is widely
acknowledged to have weakened the religious communities on all sides. Did that weakness
render them each more vulnerable to the crude nationalist manipulations that followed the
break-up of enforced communist unity?
If we were simply following the scholarly proponents of conflict theories in the years
leading up to the break-up of Yugoslavia, we would observe that the religions of the region
over several decades had come to explain less and less of the social realities in Bosnia (and
Eastern Europe in general, under socialism).  Now, however, during and after a war, the
religions are suddenly portrayed as the key interpretive formula for understanding all kinds of
mayhem erupting: rape camps, plunder and pillage, torture, massacres and genocide. In the
1970s among my many conversations in Sarajevo, not a handful in a hundred local
commentators would have tried to use religion to account for behavior in the marketplace, the
public square, the workplace, or even the home and family. Now suddenly the whole world
was quite convinced that understanding our most difficult quandaries must turn on crucial
concepts of religion.
In the wake of Bosnia’s collapse into fratricidal warfare, my own earlier observations
are bolstered by the work of the Slovenian sociologist Mitja Velikonja, who teaches at the
University of Ljubljana. His position is close enough to be almost an insider to the partisan
realities of former Yugoslavia, yet as a Slovene he is sufficiently removed to take a
perspective above the fray, as it were. His review and reflection on the eruption of violence
that tore at the fabric of Bosnian culture is entitled Religious Separation & Political
Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  12
Velikonja portrays each of Bosnia’s three primary cultural and religious traditions
following a different path into the conflicts that emerged in the breakup of Tito’s Yugoslavia.
Each one also has different memories in the aftermath. It is no small task to sift through the
competing perspectives and claims. The story cannot be told without some account of what
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was happening in the prior communist period at the federal political level, along with what
was being stirred up by separatist nationalisms in the neighboring republics, especially
Croatia and Serbia.
To speak of Bosnia is also to invoke the memory of empires: Greek, Roman,
Byzantine, Ottoman and Habsburg directly, along with the wider interplay of great games and
petty politics of the Great Powers throughout most of the previous two centuries. Waves of
military conquest, border shifts, accommodation and compromise for the sake of survival
have left an indelible imprint on each cultural group.
Of all the regional and global powers that shaped Bosnia over the centuries, almost
half a millennium of Ottoman Turkish rule is the most influential. From the conquest by
Sultan Mehmed II el Fatih in 1463 until 1878 (when the Congress of Berlin gave it to Austro-
Hungarian administration, and annexation a few decades later), Bosnia played a key role for
Ottoman strategies in Europe. At the time of the original takeover, and in most of the
following centuries, the Turks showed substantial tolerance and respectful consideration in
their policies for subject populations in their religious affiliations (Christian and Jewish).
Under the Pax Ottomanica, their “millet” system administered these groups for civil purposes
entirely through their own religious structures.
While this pattern of civil government through religious administration reinforced the
visible importance of religious leadership directly, it also forged an enduring deep linkage
between religious and national identity in the Balkans. Even though nationality consciousness
is understood to have arrived relatively late in the Balkans, delayed by at least half a century
compared to other parts of Europe, its salience was anticipated and reinforced considerably
by the millet system. So whereas ideas of citizenship and political agency emerge rather
slowly in the region, they do so through a thick layer of religious identity. A given person
was not primarily identified as a Serb, a Croat, etc., but rather as a Jew, an Orthodox
(Christian) or a Catholic. An interesting exception: the local Slavic converts to Islam, of
whom there were many especially in Islam’s first centuries in the region, thought of
themselves as Turks, although not in an ethnic or national sense. This did not even mean they
spoke Turkish, necessarily; it was their religious identity in the first place, which carried
certain social and economic privileges.
This resulted in the Bosnian Muslim identity being the last to emerge from the
tangled mix of religious and cultural identities in Bosnia. But for most Bosnians, in most of
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four centuries preceding the twentieth, a person could only become politically aware and
active through the mediation of religious officials, whose primary responsibility had much
more to do with adjusting to the status quo and maintaining a cozy set of bureaucratic
privileges through accommodation with political authorities than with the advancement of
national and cultural autonomy per se.
And so it is easily seen that four centuries of Ottoman management in Bosnia made
religion politically sensitive, even important. Religion had become the main identifying
factor for individual ethnic groups. The primary intellectual forces came from religious
circles, and until the Austro-Hungarian invasion and occupation (1878 and following),
Bosnia’s constituent populations had effectively not yet been politicized into nationalist
bodies.
This climate changed rapidly under the subsequent four decades of Habsburg
management in Bosnia. The Austro-Hungarians set out to modernize their colony as quickly
as possible, spreading electricity, trains, trams, major road systems, museums and
monumental architecture throughout the region. Quite like some other recent occupations,
they saw it as their task to transform the backward Bosnian society from chaos to cosmos,
rescuing the remains of a previous empire from confusion, corruption and anarchy. The new
powers would restore order and ensure the equality of all religious communities.
But noble goals were not enough to prevent resistance and reactions, as other
invaders and occupiers have also discovered. What the Habsburgs really managed to do was
provoke a new nationalist reaction, precisely in and through the politicization of each
respective religious community, breeding a new and virulent, confused clergy-led
nationalism. The resulting combination of religious historical grievances and new nationalist
mythmaking proved particularly poisonous throughout the 20  century. th
When the zealous ambition of the Catholic Habsburgs reached as far as annexing
Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 1908), the move set off a chain of events that led straight to
World War I. Serbs in Bosnia, borrowing heavily from new ideological consciousness across
the border in Serbia, made the tasks of occupation most difficult. Their resistance brought
down waves of repression, collective punishments and outright state terror by the Empire
against undefended civilian populations. World War indeed began in Sarajevo, with young
Bosnian Serbs assassinating Austria’s Crown Prince, Archduke Ferdinand, in 1914. The
Empire struck back with massacres, internment and ostracism. For the first time, some of
 Cf. Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, (University of California Press,13
1996), for a highly critical reading of this strand in Serbian nationalist mythmaking. Another key source by a
knowledgeable former resident of the region is the influential work by Paul Mojzes, now at Rosemont College (PA),
Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (Continuum, 1994).
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Bosnia’s inhabitants were being slaughtered solely on the basis of their national affiliation.
This ominous tone would impact the entire 20  century. It ended on precisely the same note:th
genocide, with tentacles that reached out to drag the entire watching world into a maelstrom.
From this point forward, national identity takes over the mythical character formerly
reserved to religious identity. The resulting mixture infuses claims with quasi-sacred power:
our soil is sacred, our nation chosen by God, all victims on our side are innocent, our
warriors are heroic martyrs slated for sainthood, our sufferings equate to the sufferings of the
Messiah, etc.  Particular stress is placed on the idea that anyone not with us is not only13
dangerous, wicked, etc., but a traitor to our faith, our race and our holy cause (since the
opponent by definition both should have originally belonged to our side, but is also now
opposed to our faith).
Vilification of the opposing faction reached new depths in the 20  century, first withth
the Serb-dominated monarchy of Yugoslavia between World Wars I & II, when religious
bodies were conflict-ridden, undemocratic and infused with religious intolerance, as
Velikonja portrays them. In the potent brew of militant clericalism and political reactionism,
Yugoslavia’s religious communities headed into the bloodbath of World War II armed with
anti-Semitism, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, anti-masonry and pro-fascist proclamations
from hierarchs both Orthodox and Catholic.
Velikonja describes the “War over Differences” (1992-95), as Presidents Tudjman of
Croatia and MiloÓevi of Serbia conspired to carve up Bosnia, while the West’s failure to
intervene except with feeble gestures of rebuke made matters successively worse.
Intellectuals, journalists and cultural workers on all sides fell to the lowest levels of “profane
political agitation” directed against enemies, and warlords of all stripes used religious
language and symbolism to manipulate media with xenophobia and apocalyptic fear of all
other entities. The responsibility for moral and spiritual bankruptcy which devastated every
one of Bosnia’s religious communities during four years of terror rests heavily on all parties
to the conflict. 
Religious organizations had been seriously weakened throughout communist rule in
Tito’s Yugoslavia. The new nationalist states emerging from the collapse of that order were
also quite insecure. Each one required some fresh measures of religious legitimation if they
 Velikonja, p. 288.14
 See also the work of Yale theologian Miroslav Volf, whose discussion of religions thick and thin is a15
penetrating analysis and response to some of the theoreticians of religion as conflict: “Christianity and Violence”
accessed at speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/2004/03/11_volf/volf-article.pdf. Volf, who is also native to
the region, has presented a masterful analysis in his earlier work in Exclusion and Embrace (Abingdon, 1996).
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were to secure the consent and cooperation of their fragmented populations. Velikonja calls
this process “the frail attempts at re-Christianizing and religio-national integration in post-
Socialist countries.”
Never before the twentieth century had Bosnia’s inhabitants been treating each other
in these ways: “systematic persecution, mass slaughter, dispossession, forceful proselytizing.
Never before had they been forced to seek refuge from the destructive logic of religio-
national exclusivity outside their own borders in such vast numbers,” Velikonja insists.14
Weak new states use poisonous brands of separatist nationalism, combined with cynical
schemes to offer weak old religious bodies a shortcut back to a share of power like they once
enjoyed in ancient times; the combination is, in the short run, potent and deadly.
Conclusion
The religions of Bosnia had long been tolerant, for at least four centuries. The
venomous manipulation of religious heritage and symbolism is not part of the tradition in its
deepest sense.   Velikonja assigns clear responsibility for the 1990s carnage to actions and15
inactions of foreign powers and outside forces, rather than to the constituent religious
communities. Although far too many local actors were drawn into the fray and committed
monstrous acts against their neighbors, this was not the religious heritage at work.
What are the enduring characteristics of the Bosnian chapter of Islam in Europe? And
how are these features related to the Spanish chapter we surveyed at the outset? 
Where these religious heritages are able to run deep, their witness is in fact enhanced
by their mutual interactions. Apart from the baleful impact of corrosive nationalism, and the
weakening under severe repression by forces of empire (the ailing Ottomans, and the
communists and cold warriors of the 20  century), the Christian and Jewish and Muslimth
communities of medieval Spain and recent Bosnia alike have made much benefit from their
joint engagement. This rich and multi-faceted stimulation, in the best of times and under
benign rule, seems to have brought out the best in each tradition. Those memories deserve to
be retrieved and indeed asserted over against the current rising cacophony of voices
clamoring over culture wars and clashes in Europe and farther afield.
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As Velikonja observes, “few regions and countries in premodern Europe knew so
high a level of religious diversity and tolerance as Bosnia, which is peculiar in that it has
never been homogenous (or homogenized).”  That texture of tolerance varied significantly
from one period to another, he continues. “To be sure, it was never an oasis of peace,
toleration, and comprehension between different groups as some have idealized it. On the
other hand, it has never been the oasis of persistent hatred and violence as some others have
portrayed it to be.”16
In surveying these two chapters of Islamic presence and inter-faith encounters in
Europe, we see some of the texture and supporting evidence for what becomes a key part of
Velikonja’s interpretation of Bosnia itself: its resemblance to medieval Spain. His words form
a fitting conclusion to this inquiry:
“An analogy to the Bosnian situation is that of twelfth-century Spain, once a hub of
multireligious cultural, scientific, ideological, and philosophical exchange and convivencia,
where the Bible, Qur’an, and Talmud, and ancient and contemporary philosophers and
scientists were all cherished.”17
Remembering what went right in Cordoba, Spain and Sarajevo, Bosnia can help us
negotiate more adequately the current challenges and perceived clashes of civilizations and
cultures in a world grown too small for half-hearted indifference disguised as thin tolerance
or thick intolerance. Scholars and strategists alike may benefit from attending to the emerging
patterns in which Bosnians retrieve the strengths of their religious heritages so that each can
again mutually enrich the other. The lessons of this lengthy history are both too precious and
too costly to forget.
